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Disclaimer
There are several mechanisms that allow the government and the private 
sector to contract work with the INL. These include Work-For-Others (WFO) 
agreements, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), 
and non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). Whatever mechanism is used, there are 
certain key aspects of the work that must be addressed; project scope (including 
deliverables), project schedule, project funding, and protection of proprietary 
information.
This test plan covers the vulnerability testing of the SCADA portion of a 
SCADA/EMS system. It does not test for vulnerabilities in the highly complex 
EMS portion of the system. 
This sample test plan presents only one possible method for testing. 
No testing regime can assure that all Targets of Evaluation have been 
addressed and that all vulnerabilities have been discovered. 
No testing regime can assure that a system is secure. 
References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service 
by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the 
U.S. Government, any agency thereof, or any company affiliated with the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. 
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ABSTRACT
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) prepared this generic test plan to 
provide clients (vendors, end users, program sponsors, etc.) with a sense of the 
scope and depth of vulnerability testing performed at the INL’s Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Test Bed and to serve as an example of 
such a plan. Although this test plan specifically addresses vulnerability testing of 
systems applied to the energy sector (electric/power transmission and distribution 
and oil and gas systems), it is generic enough to be applied to control systems 
used in other critical infrastructures such as the transportation sector, water/waste 
water sector, or hazardous chemical production facilities.  
The SCADA Test Bed is established at the INL as a testing environment to 
evaluate the security vulnerabilities of SCADA systems, energy management 
systems (EMS), and distributed control systems. It now supports multiple 
programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, other government agencies, and private sector clients. This 
particular test plan applies to testing conducted on a SCADA/EMS provided by a 
vendor.
Before performing detailed vulnerability testing of a SCADA/EMS, an as 
delivered baseline examination of the system is conducted, to establish a starting 
point for all-subsequent testing. The series of baseline tests document factory 
delivered defaults, system configuration, and potential configuration changes to 
aid in the development of a security plan for in depth vulnerability testing.  The 
baseline test document is provided to the System Provider,a who evaluates the 
baseline report and provides recommendations to the system configuration to 
enhance the security profile of the baseline system. Vulnerability testing is then 
conducted at the SCADA Test Bed, which provides an in-depth security analysis 
of the Vendor’s system.b
                                                     
a. The term System Provider replaces the name of the company/organization providing the system being evaluated.  This can be 
the system manufacturer, a system user, or a third party organization such as a government agency. 
b. The term Vendor (or Vendor’s) System replaces the name of the specific SCADA/EMS being tested. 
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1Vendor System Vulnerability Testing Test Plan 
1. TEST BED PROJECT OVERVIEW 
The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Test Bed established at the Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL) is a testing environment where control systems, including SCADA systems, 
Energy Management Systems (EMS) and Distributed Control Systems, are tested for security 
vulnerabilities. The SCADA Test Bed supports multiple programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, other government agencies, and private sector 
clients. This sample test plan applies to the SCADA portion of a SCADA/EMS control system selected 
for testing at the INL SCADA Test Bed. 
1.1 Vendor System Vulnerability Testing 
Before performing a vulnerability test on a SCADA/EMS, an as delivered baselinec examination of 
the system is conducted to establish a reference point for all-subsequent testing.  The series of baseline 
tests document factory delivered defaults, system configuration, and potential configuration changes to 
aid in the development of a security plan for in depth testing. The baseline test document is provided to 
the System Provider, who evaluates the baseline report and provides recommendations to the system 
configuration to enhance the security profile of the baseline system. 
This test plan supports in depth vulnerability testing of the Vendor’s SCADA/EMS, which also 
includes baseline scanning to validate the implementation the vendors’ recommendations from the 
baseline report. The vulnerability testing will provide functional security testing through an in depth 
security analysis of the Vendor’s system. 
1.2 Disclaimer 
Testing to determine the vulnerability of control systems is experimental work. As a result, there is 
no well defined and accepted testing method. Hence, the testing process is evolving and may deviate from 
this proposed plan during its implementation. Other factors that may affect plan implementation are the 
available resources, the funding organization’s need, and vulnerability findings incurred during testing.  
1.3 Customer 
The System Provider is the Funding Organizationd for vulnerability testing of the Vendor’s system, 
and is having the vendor system tested to [State the purpose/mission of the funding organization].
1.4 Utility Profile 
The INL SCADA Test Bed provides a sample utility environment where the Vendor’s system can 
be tested. In the utility profile established for this test plan, the Vendor’s system controls critical assets in 
the power transmission grid for an area. This portion of the transmission grid is a nexus for the movement 
                                                     
c. Baseline, in the context of this document, is the configuration management and testing of an “as delivered system” with all 
defaults settings left as delivered from the vendor.  
d. The term funding organization refers to the program sponsor providing funding to the INL to evaluate the SCADA/EMS. This 
is typically a Government agency such as Department of Energy or Department of Homeland Security, but could be a private 
sector partner funding the activity as part of a Work-For-Others program. 
2of power between two major areas. The utility controls the transmission of generated power upstream to 
feed an area with inadequate generating capacity downstream. Any impact on the operations of this utility 
could have a significant effect on the power grid downstream from the control area. 
1.5 Attacker Profile 
In the attacker profile established for this test plan, the attacker has knowledge of the Vendor’s 
system. Using various techniques, the attacker has penetrated the firewalls and has direct access to the 
primary network switch for the system. 
The attacker’s goals are to impact specific portions of the transmission system by taking control of 
critical components and assets (e.g., transmission grid breakers). By taking control of these breakers, the 
attacker can isolate the assets downstream from power generation upstream. This control can be obtained 
by direct manipulation of remote terminal units (RTU), a penetration of the system, or by causing the 
operator to control these breakers. 
1.6 Projected Project Schedule 
The sample overall vulnerability testing project schedule is detailed in Figure 1.  The actual 
timeline will vary based on available resources and the funding organization’s need. 
1. Preliminary Administration & General Support
2. Training & Procedure Setup
3. Cyber Testing Support
4. Cyber Testing
5. Proprietary Report to Company ABC
6. Company ABC Review Proprietary Report
7. Sanatize Report for Funding Organization
8. Company ABC Review Sanatized Report for Funding Organization
9. Issue Finalized Sanatized Report to Funding Organization
Month 4
Year
Month 5 Month 6 Month 7Month 1 Month 2 Month 3
Figure 1. Timeline showing the overall project schedule. 
The sample cyber security testing schedule is detailed in Figure 2. The actual timeline will vary 
based on available resources and the funding organization’s need. 
1. Phase 1 Validation
2. Unauthorized Access and Escalation of Privileges
3. Operators Workstation
4. Central Database Access
5. Prepare Cyber Test Report
5. Changing Alarms and Commands
6. Changing State in the RTU
7. Developers Workstation
8. Real-Time Database Access
9. Historian Database Access
Planned and Scheduled Tasks
Year
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3
Figure 2. Timeline showing the stages of cyber security testing. 
32. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The Vendor’s system is the latest security enhanced version for the vulnerability testing. Prior to 
vulnerability testing, the system was configured and checked for proper operation; this activity was 
equivalent to a Factory Acceptance Test. this test configuration will include a security plan that should 
describe connections to RTU(s), and Inter-utility Control Center Protocol (ICCP) traffic (if possible). 
The images in Appendix A, B, and C detail the Vendor’s current test configuration. 
2.1 Security Plan 
A typical system installation should have an extensive security plan that includes physical, 
personnel, and cyber security. This includes the establishment of policies, procedures, and methods to 
protect SCADA/EMS assets, and how to deal with users, user groups, password management, password 
requirements, password expiration, data protection, data integrity, and disaster recovery. The security plan 
should also include policies for virus management and individual system component use. The “use” 
portion is important to preclude the system component from being configured to perform functions 
beyond its intended use. 
In the baseline testing, no security plan was used in configuring the system. This was driven by the 
need to establish what the Vendor’s system defaults were. In this way, we were able to test the system in 
its worst-case, most vulnerable state, and identify items that need to be changed in the default 
configuration. A security plan will be adhered to for this round of testing and documented in the final 
report.
2.2 RTU Connections 
The Vendor’s system will be connected to at least one RTU. The RTU(s) will be connected to 
relays and will receive multiple analog signals from distribution relays. This will provide live data traffic 
to the Vendor’s system and allow for detailed testing of the system that was not available in the baseline 
testing. The amount and types of communication with the RTU and its availability will be limited and 
will therefore limit the amount of testing in this area. 
2.3 ICCP Traffic 
It is planned to connect to either another ICCP server on the Vendor’s system or an ICCP server in 
the SCADA Test Bed, if available. This will allow for testing of the vulnerability of communications to 
and from the Vendor’s system ICCP server. 
3. TESTING STRATEGY 
The main objective of Vulnerability testing is to demonstrate the ability of an attacker to 
compromise the operational aspects of the Vendor’s system in an attempt to damage the system or cause 
disruption of service by trying to determine the susceptibility of the system to an organized and well 
thought out, funded, and prepared attack, including the possibility of an insider attack. The test cases 
outlined in Section 4 of this document are designed to address both types of attackers or threats.  
To accomplish the objective we will (1) verify the Vendor’s implementation of recommendations 
from baseline testing and (2) perform the system security test of the Vendor’s system using the SCADA 
4Test Bed at the INL. Testing of the Vendor’s system will occur from the switch level, meaning that the 
attacker has penetrated any firewalls and is operating on the same network segment as the SCADA/EMS 
system. 
Although a portion of the testing is an evaluation of the security measures implemented as a result 
of the baseline recommendations, the majority of the testing is allocated to test specific targets or 
functional pieces of the Vendor’s system. To accomplish this, the SCADA/EMS test team generated a list 
of Targets of Evaluation (TOEs). Each of these targets has a specific test case outlined in Section 4 of this 
document. Each TOE is given a priority based on the level of functionality it provides to the Vendor’s 
system and its operational impacts to the system. Each test case is allocated an appropriate amount of 
testing time based on the priority level of the TOE. However, there are no guarantees that the targets will 
be achieved in the time frame allowed. If they are not, the status will be documented along with the steps 
accomplished and the suggested path forward. This will also include the estimated difficultly in 
completing the task and suggestions to prevent the attack. 
Vulnerability testing will not include code reviews, such as looking for buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities and other insecure practices. It is expected that subsequent rounds of testing will include 
this level of scrutiny, but, due to the complexity of the source code, it is not expected that a full code 
review will be conducted in these tests. 
Wireless connectivity to the Vendor’s system will not be tested; the Vendor does not provide 
wireless capabilities as part of the delivered system. 
4. PROPOSED TEST CASES 
The testing period and time allocations for each test case discussed in this section are negotiated as 
part of the overall testing activity. Both the funding organization and the Vendor are involved in this 
negotiation.
Vulnerability testing and reporting is scheduled over a [TBD] period. Based on available resources, 
the testing and evaluation team develops a list of desirable test cases and allotted an appropriate amount 
of time for each. Total allotted testing time is [TBD] man-hours. 
The proposed test cases begin with a validation of the vendor supplied, baseline recommendations 
and the implementation of a security plan followed by the functional testing contained in the TOEs list.e
4.1 Baseline Validation 
Baseline testing identifies potential security vulnerabilities and offers suggestions for remediation 
to the Vendor in the baseline Test Report. The Vendor then provides configuration recommendations to 
their system to improve the security profile of the system. The system then undergoes configuration 
changes that implement the recommendations of the Vendor and implements the Security Plan.  Baseline 
validation testing will compare the as delivered system to the security driven configuration to validate the 
effectiveness of these changes and document the results.  
                                                     
e.  A TOE is a portion of the Vendor’s system that is subject to testing. A TOE includes any combination and/or part of an IT 
technique, concept, method, product, system, or infrastructure and its associated administrator and user operational 
documentation. A TOE can be referred to as a product subset. A TOE is bounded by environmental assumptions. These 
assumptions are located in the Rules of Engagement. 
5Baseline validation testing is also essential to provide the testing team with the required 
information for further TOE testing. This validation test case provides the basic reconnaissance needed 
for enhanced testing and evaluation. 
4.1.1 Allocated Testing Time 
Baseline Validation testing is scheduled for the [TBD] period testing. System wide scanning and 
data analysis is scheduled to utilize [TBD] hours. 
4.1.2 Test Procedure 
A basic information technology (IT) assessment of the Vendor’s system is the first step needed in 
gathering the required data to perform all subsequent tests. This basic IT assessment includes port 
scanning, vulnerability scanning, network mapping, password cracking, and network sniffing. 
Vulnerability scans, including port scans, will be run on each of the computers. Vulnerabilities 
found will be compared to those found in baseline testing. All reported vulnerabilities will be verified as 
much as possible and included in the report to the Vendor. 
The Vendor’s principal investigator (PI) is responsible for the overall system configuration and 
operational status. During this test case, the PI’s primary responsibility is to implement the test team’s 
security policy and configure the system to Vendor’s specifications. The Vendor’s PI also assumes all 
responsibility for restoring the system to operational status, should the testing affect the system in any 
way. 
The primary task for the testing team is to perform the system analysis tests needed to produce the 
data for Baseline validation. The goal is to perform the same tests as those performed in the baseline test 
and then provide detailed information on the changes implemented in Vendor’s system. 
For convenience, the following is a list of typical tools used during baseline testing; it is expected 
that most of these tools will also be used in the vulnerability testing so that the data from both phases of 
testing can properly be compared: 
x Msinfo32.exe – A standard tool for scanning Windows computer’s software and hardware 
x AIDA3 – Provides supplemental information to the Windows System Configuration output 
x Net Diagnostics – Windows XP network diagnostics tests 
x Sys_check – Tru64 system configuration information tool 
x Superscan 4.0 – A freeware program for scanning ports and IP address 
x Cisco Assessment Tools – Used for detecting and configuration changes on network equipment 
x STAT Scanner – A MS Windows vulnerability scanner 
x John the Ripper – A multiplatform password-cracking tool 
x Nessus – An open source multiplatform vulnerability scanner 
x Nmap – An open source network and port scanner 
x Ethereal/TCPDump – Network monitoring software. 
64.1.3 Data Requirements 
Prior to running this test case, the test team will receive complete network diagrams and detailed 
system configuration information. 
Output data from the configuration, port, and vulnerability scans will be compared with output 
from the same scans performed on the original baseline system. This output data is also used in the 
subsequent TOE testing because it provides the detailed reconnaissance information needed by the testers. 
A successful test will compare the enhanced security configuration against the findings 
documented in the baseline report. This will assess whether or not the recommended configuration 
changes implemented as a result of the baseline report have been addressed in the configured system, and 
test the overall security of the Vendor’s system. 
4.2 TOE – Unauthorized Access and Escalation of Privileges 
Accessing a computer system without authorization is a common action of an attacker. Another 
attacker might be authorized to use a computer system (insider), but with restricted privileges. The intent 
of this TOE is to examine the possibility of accessing a system and/or escalating privileges such that an 
attacker can execute actions (i.e., become a “super user”) on the SCADA/EMS system. 
The ability for an attacker to obtain super user status on a machine is very dangerous because it 
gives the attacker total control of the system. With root or administrator level privileges, an intelligent 
attacker can take the necessary steps to corrupt the system, disrupt service, or act the part of a legitimate 
operator.
Privilege escalation can be executed remotely or locally from a system console. Remote privilege 
escalation is generally accomplished through service or application exploitation. Local privilege 
escalation is similar in nature, but can utilize services and/or software that are not available remotely. 
An example of a remote attack is exploiting a web sever (e.g., Apache or IIS) or file sharing service 
(e.g., Samba or network file system). Local privilege escalation could include password cracking or 
attacking a process that is running with elevated privileges. 
The following is a list of typical computer systems in a Vendor’s system configuration; this system 
list is ordered in priority of attack for this TOE: 
x Application Server 
x Active Directory Server 
x Operator Console 
x Data Acquisition Server 
x Developer Console 
x Historian Server 
x ICCP Server. 
74.2.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Due to the priority of this TOE, testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.2.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to obtain administrator, root, or operator level access on the identified 
SCADA/EMS computer systems. 
Figure 3 is a sample threat tree that outlines some of the typical steps in obtaining unauthorized 
access to an information system. This tree is not all-inclusive, but is used to demonstrate the many 
avenues that are available in an attempt to compromise a system. The paths in a threat tree are dependant 
upon the specific configuration of the system being attacked. 
Unauthorized
Access
Session
Hijacking
Remote
Compromise
Guess
Password
Access 
Password 
Files
Sniff
Network
Passwords 
in Clear Text
Remote
Access 
(Open Port)
Direct 
Access to 
System
Vulnerable 
Port or 
Service
Weak 
Passwords
Social
Engineering
Compromise 
Password 
Files
Direct File 
Access
Brute Force 
Attack
Physical 
Access to 
Restricted 
Area
Figure 3. Unauthorized system access. 
Utilizing the data from the Baseline validation test (reconnaissance), the testers will attempt to 
exploit known vulnerabilities to accomplish this test. The data gathered provides a clearer picture to the 
Test Team and allows for refinement of the threat trees. In particular, vulnerable services and ports as 
well as weak password implementation will be checked. 
4.2.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Baseline validation test is essential information for the testers.  
All exploit attempts, and their results, will be documented and published in the Vulnerability 
report. It is also understood that privilege escalation on a system may not provide the attacker with the 
ability to perform any actions on the SCADA/EMS system; therefore, each exploit attempt will also detail 
what type of SCADA/EMS level compromise was actually possible once the exploit was successful. 
8Successful tests are those that allow the attacker to gain access to a system as a user capable of 
performing SCADA/EMS operations. 
4.3 TOE – Operators Workstation 
The operator’s consoles are the workstations used for command and control of the SCADA/EMS. 
These computers provide the human-machine interface (HMI) for the Vendor’s system, making them a 
critical component in a SCADA/EMS system because it is the primary means of controlling the 
environment. In this configuration there is one operator’s console.  
The operators console has access to control the power grid, but does not have the resources to 
change the SCADA/EMS system. This is the function of the developer’s console. In a typical 
SCADA/EMS system, physical access to the operator’s console is often easier than the developer’s 
console and is therefore targeted in this testing before the developer’s workstation. 
This test case examines the possibility for an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the system 
with the ability to issue commands using the HMI, thus having complete control of the SCADA/EMS 
system. For example, an attacker has direct access to all system functionality and HMI screens by using 
the XP Remote Desktop service. 
4.3.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing of this TOE is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.3.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to evaluate the multiple avenues by which an attacker can gain access 
to the operator’s workstation. This can include physical access to the system or some other means of 
remote access. 
The most desirable end result is to have an interactive desktop view of the operator’s workstation. 
This will allow the attacker to see all of the HMI screens and to interact with the SCADA/EMS 
environment through the HMI. With this goal in mind, it is proposed that the testers attempt to gain 
physical access, or interactive remote access using tools such as Remote Desktop or Virtual Network 
Computing (VNC). 
Figure 4 is a sample threat tree for unauthorized access to a PC or workstation. These are just some 
of the methods an attacker might use to compromise the system. This tree details the specific need for 
remote graphical access, not just remote shell access. This is due to the goal of the TOE to include 
interactive access with the HMI screens. 
4.3.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Baseline validation test and the results from the privilege 
escalation tests are critical information for the testers. 
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Figure 4. Access the operations workstation. 
The output data for this test case is the successful or unsuccessful control of the SCADA/EMS 
system though the operator’s workstation. This will include the details of how access was gained. For 
example, Remote Desktop may not be enabled by default, but an Administrator level compromise may 
allow the attacker to enable Remote Desktop and then accomplish this goal. 
A successful test is determined by the ability of the test team to gain an interactive remote logon 
session.  This session should include more than shell access and should mimic that of a Remote Desktop 
session or a VNC session.  The goal is to have access to the HMI screens and functionality. 
4.4 TOE – Central Database Access 
The Central database typically contains all the information about the SCADA/EMS system 
network including configuration information, EMS data, system maps, and all information tying the data 
gathered from the RTU (in the real time database) to the descriptive data used in the HMI. 
The Central database is of particular interest due to the complete system information contained 
therein. For example, the HMI only contains simple information that is used by an operator familiar with 
the SCADA/EMS. The Central database, however, contains information on the SCADA/EMS 
components shown on the HMI screens. Due to these facts, the Central database is the primary target for 
this test. 
Keeping the information in the SCADA/EMS databases confidential is a high priority because it is 
what allows for a coordinated, intelligent, and perhaps stealthy attack. This information could be used to 
identify critical assets for a cyber and/or physical attack. 
4.4.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
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4.4.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to evaluate the multiple avenues by which an attacker can gain access 
to the Central database. The attack can include direct access to the database system after remotely 
accessing the machine or access using “trusted” systems that normally connect to or receive data from the 
Central database. The main objective is to mine information from the Central database. 
The Central database contains critical system information, raw data, real-time information and 
information for constructing some of the other databases in the SCADA/EMS system. 
Central database systems can be configured in a variety of ways with regards to authentication. 
Typically there are two methods of authentication:  
1. Directory service, network or operating system authentication  
2. Database authentication using Central database user accounts and passwords 
The test team will attempt to authenticate to the database server and access the database 
information using Active Directory and/or Operating System authentication. The team will also attempt to 
establish a connection to the server via the central database port and authenticate using default Central 
database user accounts and passwords. 
Another process for accessing the Central database is to compromise the developer’s workstation. 
The developer’s workstation is likely to have access to the Central database because a SCADA/EMS 
developer is the person creating, updating, or modifying that information. Figure 5 is a sample threat tree 
for compromising a Central database system and outlines some of the possible paths for gaining 
unauthorized access to the data. 
Database
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Figure 5.  Central database. 
11
4.4.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Baseline validation test and the results from the privilege 
escalation tests are critical information for the testers. 
The key data to capture in this test is the amount of information mined from the Central database. 
Likewise, it is assumed that some custom software may be needed in order to mine useful information 
from the system. The custom software used for this process will be part of the reporting data. 
A successful test is one in which the attacker retrieves data from the Central database that can be 
used to provide a detailed view of the SCADA/EMS environment. 
4.5 TOE – Changing Alarms and Commands 
Alarms and commands are the method for communication between the HMI and the Data 
acquisition server. Commands are sent by the HMI to take an action in the SCADA/EMS system. Alarms 
are sent by the data acquisition server to alert the operator of various events. The integrity and timely 
delivery of alarms and commands is critical in a SCADA/EMS system. 
4.5.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.5.2 Test Procedure 
One method of attack might be to analyze the network traffic among the data acquisition server, the 
developer’s workstation, and the operator’s workstation (HMI), and to develop a man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) style of manipulation. 
Two suggested attempts are:  
1. Place an additional computer on the SCADA/EMS network that Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) poisons the switch and then manages the traffic between the console and the real-time server  
2. Inject software on the console or the real-time server that analyzes network traffic prior to allowing 
it to be processed by the application layer of the system 
If time allows, another attack or test is to perform security analysis on communication traffic 
protocol used by the data acquisition server and the HMI. Analysis of this protocol might discover 
potential vulnerabilities in the protocol handlers. 
Delete and/or change alarm or command traffic between the real-time server and the operator 
console. Change the state (or spoof) of the operator console so that the operator has the wrong picture of 
the system status. 
4.5.3 Data Requirements 
A detailed composition of the message format and the complete process for changing both an alarm 
and a command is valuable information for obtaining this TOE. This includes documentation on 
communication traffic protocol, used by the Vendor’s system to communicate with the operator consoles. 
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A communications map of how the data acquisition server and the HMI transmit messages may also be 
built to help with this effort. 
A successful test is one that disrupts normal command and alarm traffic by deleting messages from 
the network or changing the content of the message. Another successful test would be the creation of 
bogus command or alarm messages. 
4.6 TOE – Changing State in the RTU 
A RTU is a hardware device used in SCADA/EMS systems for interfacing with various analogue 
and digital signals. RTU’s are often used for controlling equipment such as substation breakers. Changing 
the state of an RTU could send a command to the connected components of the electrical grid and control 
them (e.g., opening a closed breaker). 
A man-in-the-middle attack between the communication output of the SCADA/EMS and the RTU 
will be attempted in this TOE. 
4.6.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.6.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to analyze the communication link between the SCADA/EMS 
communication port and the RTU and develop a means to send a message to change state in the RTU. The 
COM port will be used to attempt to attack this target. This will be done on a serial port connection and a 
TCP/IP connection if available. 
4.6.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Baseline Validation test and the results from the privilege 
escalation tests are critical information for the testers. 
Detailed information on the communication format between the system and RTU must be obtained 
in order to perform the man-in-the-middle attack. 
A successful test is one that changes the state of the RTU. 
4.7 TOE – Developers Workstation 
The developer’s workstation is a workstation used for system development of the SCADA. It is a 
tempting target because it usually has direct access to system resources (e.g., the central database) that are 
not accessible to other operator consoles or workstations. 
This test case will examine the possibility for an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the system 
with the ability to access other portions of the SCADA/EMS system, acting in the role of a SCADA/EMS 
developer.
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4.7.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.7.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to evaluate the multiple avenues by which an attacker can gain access 
to the developer’s workstation. This can include physical access to the system or some other means of 
remote access (e.g. Remote Desktop, VNC, etc.). 
Figure 6 is an abstract Threat Tree for unauthorized access to a PC or workstation. These are just 
some of the methods an attacker might use to compromise the system. 
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Valid 
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Exploitable 
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Valid 
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Physical 
Access to 
Restricted 
Area
Figure 6. Access the developer’s workstation. 
The most desirable end result is to have an interactive desktop view of the developer’s workstation. 
This will allow the attacker to see all of the HMI screens and to interact with the all of the other 
SCADA/EMS systems. With this goal in mind, it is proposed that the test team attempt to gain physical 
access, or interactive remote access using tools such as Remote Desktop or VNC. 
4.7.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Baseline Validation test and the results from the privilege 
escalation tests are critical information for the testers. 
The output data for this test case is the successful or unsuccessful control of the SCADA/EMS 
system though the developer’s workstation. For example, Remote Desktop may not be enabled by default, 
but an Administrator level compromise may allow the attacker to enable Remote Desktop and then 
accomplish this goal. 
A successful test is determined by the ability of the test team to gain an interactive remote logon 
session.  This session should include more than shell access and should mimic that of a Remote Desktop 
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session or a VNC session.  The goal is to have access to the developer’s resources (e.g. development 
environment, database access, HMI, etc.). 
4.8 TOE – Compromise the Communication Processor 
A RTU should only change state when a command is received from the Vendor’s communication 
processor. If an attacker can directly control the RTU, or control the RTU from the communication 
processor, they then have the power to control a portion of the SCADA/EMS system. 
In this test-bed configuration, simulated analogue signals are sent from the RTU connected to a 
relay board (simulator), to the data acquisition server. Commands to open or close a breaker are typically 
sent from the HMI. In this test, we will try to send a command directly to the RTU from another host on 
the network. 
4.8.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.8.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to compromise the communication processor and send messages 
directly from the communication processor to the RTU. By penetrating the communication processor, the 
attacker would not need a specific definition of RTU type, communications connection type, or RTU 
protocol used. With the Vendor’s system, if you could penetrate the communication processor and act as 
the SCADA/EMS system, you only need to talk the Vendor’s default RTU protocol. 
This test case will analyze the network traffic between the communication processor and the RTU 
and develop a means to send a message to change state in the RTU. This will involve network traffic 
analysis. 
4.8.3 Data Requirements 
Detailed information on how the communication processor operates in the Vendor’s system. 
Detailed information on the format of messages sent to the communication processor and messages 
sent from the communication processor to the RTU. 
A successful test is one that spoofs the communication processor into sending messages to the RTU 
or direct control of the communication processor with the ability to generate and send messages to RTU. 
4.9 TOE – Data Acquisition Database Access 
The Data Acquisition database contains all the information gathered from the SCADA/EMS 
system in real time. For example, this database contains the latest values reported by a RTU for a 
particular segment in the grid. 
4.9.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
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4.9.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to evaluate the multiple avenues by which an attacker can gain access 
to the Data Acquisition database. The attack can include direct access to the database system after 
remotely accessing the machine or access using trusted systems that normally connect to or receive data 
from the database. The main objective is to mine information from the Data Acquisition database. 
The test team will attempt to authenticate to the database server and access the database 
information.  
4.9.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Phase 1 Validation test is essential information for the test team.  
In addition, the results from the privilege escalation tests area critical information for the testers.  Along 
with the reconnaissance data, the test team requires detailed information on the operations and 
configurations or the real-time database (i.e. identification of the files used, communication channels, 
etc.).
A successful test is one in which data is retrieved or changed in the real-time database.  It might 
also include the denial of service of the real-time server so that updates are neither transmitted nor 
received.
4.10 TOE – Historian Database Access 
The Historian database contains all the information from the central database selected for archive. 
4.10.1 Allocated Testing Period 
Testing is tentatively scheduled for [TBD] hours. 
4.10.2 Test Procedure 
The goal for this test case is to evaluate the multiple avenues by which an attacker can gain access 
to the Historian database. The attack can include direct access to the database system after remotely 
accessing the machine or access using “trusted” systems that normally connect to or receive data from the 
database. The main objective is to mine information from the Historian database. 
The test team will attempt to authenticate to the database server and access the database 
information.  
4.10.3 Data Requirements 
The reconnaissance data from the Phase 1 Validation test is essential information for the testers.  In 
addition, the results from the privilege escalation tests area critical information for the testers.  Along with 
the reconnaissance data, the test team requires detailed information on the operations and configurations 
or the historian database (i.e. identification of the files used, communication channels, etc.).  It is assumed 
that some custom software may be needed in order to mine useful information from the system.  The 
custom software used for this process will be part of the reporting data. 
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A successful test is one in which the attacker retrieves data from the historian system that can be 
used to provide a detailed view of the SCADA environment. 
5. VULNERABILITY SCORING 
While conducting vulnerability assessments, it is important to define a set of metrics with which to 
score or rank the importance of the discovered vulnerabilities. The Department of Homeland Security’s 
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) developed a common scoring system to evaluate 
vulnerabilities found in a variety of information systems. Their goal is to provide a set of metrics for 
evaluating vulnerability’s threat to an information system. This scoring system, which is still in draft 
form, is known as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). At the time of writing this test 
plan, the current CVSS version was Draft 0.2. 
The INL Test Team does not endorse any single tool or method for scoring or ranking 
vulnerabilities, but it does recognize the importance of defining a set of metrics that are used, and can be 
reused, to quantify the finding of a vulnerability assessment. Due to this need, (enter scoring method here) 
has been selected for scoring the vulnerabilities found during vulnerability testing. 
As a special note, it is not the intent of any testing conducted by the SCADA Test Bed to provide 
and overall security ranking of a SCADA/EMS system. The ranking of vulnerabilities found in 
Vulnerability testing is solely for the use of the Vendor in directing future improvements to the Vendor’s 
system. 
The abstract found in the (enter scoring method here) Document states: 
(Enter scoring method abstract here) 
Appendix D contains an example matrix from CVSS 0.2. This example shows how the different 
metrics of vulnerability contribute to an overall base score, temporal score, and environmental score. The 
explanation of these scores is found in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System document. 
6. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
Outlines of the assumptions that the test team can make and a definition of the environmental 
conditions in which all parties are to operate are contained in this section. The INL Test Team and the site 
test team established these rules of engagement as a foundation for how the Vulnerability testing will be 
performed. At a minimum, all activities conducted during Vulnerability testing will adhere to the 
following agreements and assumptions: 
Agreements 
x All information will be protected from unauthorized access in accordance with the data security 
agreement. 
x The INL will suspend testing at the request of the site Vendor’s PI, or if there are legitimate safety, 
security, or operational concerns. 
x Maintain frequent communications with the site Vendor’s PI on the status of testing activities. 
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x Upon completion of testing, the INL will work with the site Vendor’s PI and provide detailed 
information on how to return computer systems to their original configuration so that no systems 
are left in a compromised condition. 
x In the unlikely event that performance testing adversely affects an information system, the INL will 
work with the site Vendor’s PI to determine the nature of the problem and restore the system to its 
desired state of operation. 
x The INL Test Team may exclude some cyber systems from performance testing activities 
Assumptions
x All cyber testing is performed from the same network segment as the Vendor’s SCADA/EMS (the 
attacker is plugged into the same switch). 
x The vulnerability tester will operate as if all items listed in the security document are indeed 
implemented. 
x The servers are located in a separate, physically secure, area from the developer and operator 
consoles. The attack team will not have physical access to these servers. 
x The attack team will perform some testing directly on the operator and developer consoles. These 
tests will demonstrate some of the insider threat capabilities. 
x The operator and developers consoles have no removable storage. This includes floppy disk drives, 
CD/DVD drives, or USB ports. All have been physically removed from the consoles. 
6.1 Security Plan Adherence 
The INL Test Team will test the Vendor’s system under the assumption that all security measures 
outlined in the security plan are implemented. This will allow the site Vendor’s PI to prepare the system 
for operations without worrying about controls and procedures that are impractical to implement (e.g., 
some physical security protection measures). 
6.2 Equipment Assumptions 
INL Test Team will test the Vendor’s system under the assumption that the system is not in 
production use and there are no real world consequences for any operational downtime (the lights are not 
going to turn off when the system shuts down). 
INL Test Team is planning on testing the Vendor’s system while live data is available, at a 
minimum, between Vendor’s system and a single RTU. This live data is critical in performing the 
enhanced operational tests. 
6.3 Software Assumptions 
Although the Vendor’s software source code is available to the INL, the INL Test Team will not 
examine the source code prior to performing any security tests. Software code review is well beyond the 
scope of this set of tests. 
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7. STAFFING 
Staffing will be varied depending on the expertise required to fully implement this plan and the 
resources available to meet these needs. The table below attempts to provide the key personnel for this 
test plan. 
Name Responsibility Clearance Requirements 
 PI on Vendor’s system  “Secret” 
 Co-PI on Vendor’s system  “Secret” 
 Cyber PI - Vulnerability testing and reporting “Secret” 
 Windows security scans and analysis “Secret” 
 Vulnerability testing support as needed “Secret” 
8. INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN 
The test environment is the Vendor’s donated system. Vulnerability testing will be conducted from 
computers connected to the system switch. Testers will provide their own machines and tools for testing 
the system. 
8.1 Software Requirements 
The Vendor has supplied the system to be tested and the cyber research group will supply the 
software, hardware, and operating systems required for testing. 
8.2 INL Owned Testing Hardware 
The following table lists the testing hardware owned by the INL. 
Hardware Description Manufacturer Model
Remote Telemetry Unit   
Distribution Relays   
Communications Processor   
Signal Generator   
Relays and Displays   
8.3 Test Bed Environment 
Test personnel will have access to the Vendor’s test cubical after signing the Vendor’s security 
requirements document. A table and connection to the Vendor’s network switch will be available for use 
during testing. 
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9. REPORTS 
A log will be kept of all the tests performed and their results. An internal cyber security testing 
report is due at the end of the testing period. This report will be used to create a report for the Vendor that 
includes vulnerabilities and suggested mediation for the Vendor’s system. Other required deliverable 
external reports are a Vulnerability Report protected at an agreed upon level and a Sanitized Report for 
public release. 
10. RISKS AND CONTINGENCIES 
The following table lists the risks and contingencies associated with this test plan. 
Risk #1 The Vendor’s system is not fully configured and ready for testing on January 3, 2005. 
Contingency #1 Baseline validation testing will begin even if the Vendor’s system has no live data. 
Baseline validation testing does not require live data. During this period, it is expected 
that the site Vendor’s PI’s will continue to work on bringing the Vendor’s system into 
operational status. 
Contingency #2 All live data testing (TOE testing) will be suspended until the Vendor’s system is in 
operational status. 
11. MILESTONES AND DELIVERABLES 
The following table outlines major milestones and deliverables for this phase of testing. 
Milestone Task Start Date End Date Deliverables
Test Plan   Test Plan Approval 
Cyber Test Report   Test Result Summary 
Vendor’s Test Report   Test Results & Recommendations 
Sanitized Final Report   Sanitized Report for public release 
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Appendix A 
Physical Components
Place diagram of the Vendor’s Physical Components here 
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Appendix B 
Vendor’s System 
Place Vendor’s system Process Flow Chart Here 
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Appendix C 
INL’s SCADA Test Bed 
Place Diagram of INL’s SCADA Test Bed here. 
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Appendix D 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(Note: this is an example of a scoring matrix; the matrix for the scoring system used 
should be used to replace the example below) 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Version 0.2
Vulnerability
Microsoft Outlook 
Express Scripting 
vulnerability
Microsoft LSASS 
vulnerability BGP potential DOS
CVE number CAN-2004-0380 CAN-2004-0533 CAN-2004-0589
URL
Access Vector REMOTE REMOTE REMOTE LOCAL
Access Complexity HIGH LOW HIGH HIGH
Authentication NOT-REQUIRED NOT-REQUIRED NOT-REQUIRED REQUIRED
Confidentiality Impact COMPLETE COMPLETE NONE NONE
Integrity Impact COMPLETE COMPLETE NONE NONE
Availability Impact COMPLETE COMPLETE COMPLETE NONE
Impact Bias NORMAL NORMAL AVAILABILITY NORMAL
(invariant score) 8.0 10.0 4.0 0.0
Exploitability FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL UNPROVEN UNPROVEN
Remediation Level OFFICIAL-FIX OFFICIAL-FIX UNAVAILABLE OFFICIAL-FIX
Report Confidence CONFIRMED CONFIRMED CONFIRMED UNCONFIRMED
BASE SCORE 6.6 8.3 3.4 0.0
Collateral Damage Potential NONE NONE NONE NONE
Target Distribution HIGH HIGH HIGH NONE
6.6 8.3 3.4 0.0ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE
Invariant M
etrics
Tem
pora
l M
etrics
